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Transition Without Transformation: The Legacy
of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Gene Carolan*
A B S T R A C T
In recent years, the transitional justice framework has expanded to include a broader
notion of transformative justice, which strives for socio-political reform in addition to
legal accountability. Over the course of two civil wars, Sudan has grappled with various
attempts at transition and transformation with mixed results. Though the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement brought an end to decades of North–South conflict,
South Sudan’s subsequent descent into civil war has been characterised by a flawed
transition and a lack of any immediate transformative potential.
This paper analyses the Comprehensive Peace Agreement’s transitional mecha-
nisms. In doing so, it explores how certain mechanisms frame the ‘meta-conflict’ about
what the conflict is about, and how this can cut off a range of conflict resolution oppor-
tunities. It concludes by considering the legacy of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement in contemporary Sudan and South Sudan, and how it might inform the
prospective transitions in both countries.
K E Y W O R D S : Sudan, Comprehensive Peace Agreement, transition, transformation
I . I N T R O D U C T I O N
Despite its recognition as a key pillar of the peacebuilding framework,1 the term
“transitional justice” continues to elude a precise definition. Transitional justice has
been described as ‘an entire field of inquiry,2 embracing a range of postconflict prac-
tices, including peacebuilding, reconciliation and restorative justice; and mechanisms
such as ad hoc tribunals, specialised courts and indigenous models of justice. In the
early 21st century, a ‘hybrid’ model of peacebuilding emerged, marrying international
concerns about human rights norms and accountability to local concerns about
agency and autonomy in the postconflict transition. With the decline of liberal inter-
ventionism and the failures of that model evident in Libya and Afghanistan, contem-
porary transitional justice continues to compliment ‘bottom—up’ approaches to
peacebuilding. The field has gradually recognised an emerging concept of ‘trans-
formative justice,’ which rests on the transformation of social, economic and political
* Technological University Dublin. Email: gene.carolan@tudublin.ie
1 Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, The
Challenge of Sustaining Peace, (29 June 2015), para. 39.
2 Ruti Teitel, ‘Editorial Note – Transitional Justice Globalized’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 2,
no. 1 (2008): 1.
VC The Author(s) (2020). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
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structures through holistic processes rather than predefined outcomes.3 This concep-
tualisation of justice as not only legal but social has the potential to unleash trans-
formative dynamics at the local level.4 These dynamics, in turn, have positive knock
on effects in terms of the perceived legitimacy of international peacebuilding initia-
tives, and the sustainability of that peace.5
Sudan is no stranger to the challenges of transitional justice. Over the course of
two civil wars, Sudan grappled with various attempts at transition and transformation
with mixed results. In 2005, decades of North–South conflict came to an end under
the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA boasted many
of the features of ‘transition’: reform of legal and political structures, the security sec-
tor; and the redistribution of power and wealth. In the absence of any substantive
progress on these issues, the people of South Sudan voted to become an independ-
ent state in January 2011. However, independence did not bring about social
transformation; quite the opposite. The distribution of political power amongst a
North–South elite threatened the transition from the outset, and inhibited genuine
transformation in both Sudan and South Sudan. The consequences of this arrange-
ment continue to play themselves out in those countries today.
Accordingly, this paper explores the transitional mechanisms that secured transi-
tion but squandered transformation under the CPA. In doing so, it makes a unique
contribution to the discourse on political settlements, the transitional/transformative
dynamic and the overlap between both frameworks and common peacebuilding
strategies. The paper begins by considering transitional justice and its relationship
with sustainable peacebuilding. Section III provides a brief introduction to the popu-
lar narratives used to frame the North–South conflict in Sudan, and how these relate
to the meta-conflict underpinning the CPA. Section IV explores the CPA’s transi-
tional mechanisms and considers the spaces where conflict transformation could
have occurred. Section V traces the legacy of the CPA to the contemporary transi-
tions in Sudan and South Sudan. To conclude, Section VI surmises the limits of
Sudan’s transition under the CPA, and argues that a transformative approach can
better inform the design and sustainable implementation of transitional mechanisms.
Such mechanisms duly comprise an important component of the peacebuilding
framework, as is argued in the next section.
I I . T R A N S I T I O N A L J U S T I C E A N D P E A C E B U I L D I N G
Before asserting the role of peacebuilding infrastructures in transitional justice, it is
important to define what is meant by the term. Indeed, “transitional justice” has
been used to refer to a wide range of postconflict practices, including peacebuilding,
reconciliation and restorative justice.6 Rowen has described the ‘malleability’ of the
3 Paul Gready and Simon Robins, ‘From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for
Practice’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 8, no. 3 (2014): 340.
4 Ibid.
5 Dustin N. Sharp, ‘Emancipating Transitional Justice from the Bonds of the Paradigmatic Transition’,
International Journal of Transitional Justice 9, no. 1 (2014): 150–69, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/iju021;
Wendy Lambourne, ‘Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence’, International Journal of
Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009): 28–48, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijn037.
6 Gready and Robins, supra n 3 at 350.
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term as both a strength and a weakness. On the one hand, it can be presented as an
alternative to externally imposed, western legal tradition; on the other, its elusive def-
inition means it may be perceived ‘as meaning everything, and, therefore, meaning
nothing.’7
Transitional justice was initially used to label the variety of means through which
societies grappled with the abuses of authoritarian regimes in the late 1980s and early
1990s.8 As the decade progressed, the term served as a catch all for a variety of legal
processes; including specialised courts, ad hoc tribunals, truth commissions, and
other efforts ‘to redress mass violence.’9 In 2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
defined the UN’s normative commitment to transitional justice as embracing ‘the full
range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses. . ..’10 The Secretary General’s report
noted that transitional justice measures should not be prescribed in isolation, but
should be regarded as part of a whole: ‘strategies must be holistic, incorporating inte-
grated attention to individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional
reform, vetting and dismissals, or an appropriately conceived combination thereof.’11
Bell notes that the Secretary General’s report affected a paradigm shift: a recognition
that the concept of transitional justice comprised ‘a range of political and social goals
beyond accountability.’12
Determining the political and social goals that align with the transitional justice
framework remains a subject of scholarly debate, however. As McAuliffe notes, all of
the debates in the ‘advocacy-cum-policy-oriented’ transitional justice literature ‘impli-
citly or explicitly relate to the field’s self-identity,’ an identity that has become in-
creasingly contested.13 Over a very short period of time, the field has raced from
debates on peace versus justice and restorative justice versus punitive justice; to ques-
tions as to how transitional justice might accommodate broader agendas like socio-
economic justice, everyday security, and women’s rights.14 A holistic understanding
of transitional justice has allowed each of these perspectives to be accommodated,
but it has not always produced concrete lessons for policy and practice—a critique
advanced most forcefully by McAuliffe.15 Instead, holistic processes ‘of expanding
7 Jamie Rebecca Rowen, ‘“We Don’t Believe in Transitional Justice:” Peace and the Politics of Legal Ideas
in Colombia.’, Law & Social Inquiry 42, no. 3 (2017): 640–41.
8 Teitel, supra n 2 at 1; Christine Bell, ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the “Field”
or “Non-Field”’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009): 7.
9 Rowen, supra n 7 at 624-625.
10 Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict
Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616 (2004), 4, para. 8.
11 Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict
Societies, supra n 10 at 4, para. 8 in Pablo De Greiff, ‘Theorizing Transitional Justice’, in Transitional
Justice: Nomos Li, ed. Melissa Williams, Rosemary Nagy, and Jon Elster (New York: New York University
Press, 2012), 31.
12 Bell, supra n 8 at 9.
13 Padraig McAuliffe, ‘Reflections of the Nexus between Justice and Peacebuilding’, Journal of Intervention
and Statebuilding 11, no. 2 (3 April 2017): 250, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2017.1287636.
14 ibid.
15 Pádraig McAuliffe, Transformative Transitional Justice and the Malleability of Post-Conflict States
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017); McAuliffe, supra n 13; Lauren Marie Balasco,
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the interdisciplinary spaces within transitional justice’ have become divorced from
the actual study of post-conflict ecologies.16
This article does not seek to lend credence to McAuliffe’s critique by arguing that
peacebuilding activities constitute an important component of the transitional justice
framework. Rather, it is submitted herein that the link between the two is central to
understanding McAuliffe’s ‘post-conflict ecologies.’ Though transitional justice ‘has
not generally been conceived as an analytical category for understanding sustainable
peacebuilding,’17 the two are to some extent mutually constitutive of one another. In
the early 1990s; transitional justice, multiparty democracy, and free markets emerged
as pillars of a liberal peacebuilding project that had the democratic state as its end-
point.18 Transitional justice—with its commitment to the rule of law and respect for
basic civil and political rights—comprised an important stepping stone towards this
overall goal.19 However, the liberal peacebuilding project often manifested as a state-
centred paradigm that prioritized institutional change over local and particular
needs.20 The frequent prescription of state-centred peacebuilding initiatives was
based on the analysis that conflict recurrence is linked to State capacity.21 However,
State capacity cannot be built in isolation from the society which it must serve.22
Indeed, Gready and Robins contend that the perceived equivalence of statebuilding
and peacebuilding ‘has seen transitional justice practice. . . fail in fragile states.’23
Liberal peacebuilding strategies were often simplified in their design, favouring pro-
fessional expertise and best practice over local customs and civil society structures.24
As a result, affected populations were frequently left with paper institutions that were
divorced from the societies in which they function, unable to provide for everyday
‘Locating Transformative Justice: Prism or Schism in Transitional Justice?’, International Journal of
Transitional Justice 12, no. 2 (1 July 2018): 368–78, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijy004.
16 McAuliffe, supra n 13 at 250.
17 Lambourne, supra n 5 at 29.
18 Stef Vandeginste and Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Power Sharing and Transitional Justice: A Clash of
Paradigms?’, Global Governance 17, no. 4 (2011): 489–505; Gready and Robins, supra n 3.
19 Vandginste and Sriram, supra n 18; L. J. Laplante, ‘Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing
and Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence through a Human Rights Framework’, International
Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (17 October 2008): 331–55, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijn031;
De Greiff, supra n 11.
20 Sharp, supra n 5 at 163; Gready and Robins, supra n 3.
21 Cedric de Coning, ‘From Peacebuilding to Sustaining Peace: Implications of Complexity for Resilience
and Sustainability’, Resilience 4, no. 3 (2016): 173, https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2016.1153773;
Aleksi Ylönen, ‘Reflections on Peacebuilding Interventionism: State and Nationbuilding Dilemmas in
Southern Sudan (2005 to the Present)’, Global Change, Peace & Security 28, no. 2 (3 May 2016): 213–23,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2016.1159548; Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., The
Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, Security and
Governance Series (London; New York: Routledge, 2009); Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, ‘Writing
the History of the Future: Securing Stability through Peace Agreements’, Journal of Intervention and
Statebuilding 1, no. 3 (1 November 2007): 275–306, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970701592249;
Advisory Group of Experts, supra n 1.
22 Cedric de Coning, John Karlsrud, and Paul Troost, ‘Towards More People-Centric Peace Operations:
From “Extension of State Authority” to “Strengthening Inclusive State-Society Relations”’, Stability:
International Journal of Security & Development 4, no. 1 (2015): 1–13.
23 Gready and Robins, supra n 3 at 341-342.
24 Kieran McEvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice’, Journal of
Law and Society 34, no. 4 (2007): 424.
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security and welfare requirements. Many of these critiques manifest themselves in
the Sudanese transition under the CPA, as will be detailed below.
In the years since, critiques of transitional justice strategies have come to mirror
many of the charges levelled against liberal peacebuilding activities:
[T]hat they have been externally driven, being planned and implemented in a
‘top-down’ state-centric manner that tends to marginalize local values and
practices, and that they are presented as neutral and apolitical solutions to
highly contested questions.25
Transitional justice fits this pattern insofar as it prioritizes individual acts of violence
and violations of civil and political rights over ‘chronic structural violence and un-
equal social relations.’26 Populations affected by legacies of violence have limited in-
put into the design and the purpose of transitional justice mechanisms; and often
participate in highly prescribed ways: ‘as witnesses, as defendants or through the giv-
ing of testimony.’ 27 The tendency to prioritize formal institutions and privileged dis-
courses—such as law and the language of human rights—can potentially exclude
affected populations and empower elites, leading to a situation where justice is a con-
cept claimed on behalf of victims rather than by victims themselves.28 In contrast,
local input and popular access to transitional justice processes offer opportunities to
challenge power relations at both the local and international levels. The resulting
benefits ‘trickle up’ the peacebuilding infrastructure in a ‘bottom-up’ inversion of pre-
vious peacebuilding strategies.29
This inversion of typical peacebuilding models is reflective of the transformative
turn in transitional justice scholarship.30 Transformative justice can be distinguished
from transitional justice insofar as it looks beyond the ‘injustices related to the conse-
quences of conflict, to the neglect of the injustices implicit in the causes and symp-
toms of the conflict.’31 Transformative justice’s mandate duly extends to
socioeconomic rights, everyday security, and other markers of positive peace; in add-
ition to the violations of physical, civil and political rights that frequently characterise
post-conflict settings.32 Gready and Robins describe transformative justice as a bal-
ance of principle and pragmatism, where the need to pursue wrongdoers must be off-
set against whatever best institutionalizes peace and effective service delivery.
Accordingly, socioeconomic rights should be employed as a means to address local
needs, and to challenge intersections between economics and power. A transforma-
tive approach must also recognise that conflict that appears new is often ‘rooted in
25 Sharp, supra n 5 at 155.
26 Gready and Robins, supra n 3 at 342.
27 Ibid at 343.
28 Ibid at 343 [emphasis added]; McAuliffe, supra n 15.
29 Sharp, supra n 5 at 164.
30 McAuliffe, supra n 15.
31 Rama Mani, ‘Balancing Peace with Justice in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict’, Development 48, no. 3
(September 2005): 27, https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.development.1100165.
32 Balasco, supra n 15.
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ongoing experiences of social marginalization, political exclusion and economic ex-
ploitation.’33 A transformative approach will be committed to uprooting these cycles
of violence and preventing future conflict. A transformative lens is thus particularly
appropriate for a case study of Sudan’s transition.
Gready and Robins argue that transformative justice should be locally driven, ‘be-
cause such change is most likely to be informed by the local and particular needs of
people in communities where legacies of violence play out.’34 Accordingly, a trans-
formative approach will emphasise local agency and resources in the design, imple-
mentation and evaluation of transitional mechanisms. Local input is also central to
challenging the socio-political and economic structures that may have characterised
the state-society relationship hitherto. A transformative approach duly requires a crit-
ical analysis of participation in transitional justice mechanisms: a focus on ‘whose
voice is heard and which organisations gain a seat at the table.’35 Where a trans-
formative approach is employed rigorously, it is potentially emancipatory: post-
conflict transition not only checks and punishes mass violence, but responds to the
needs of the population as identified by the population, from below.36 In upending
existing social structures, transformative justice seeks to unleash the social dynamics
that can fuel and sustain transformation: societal transformation is both the starting
point and the intended result.37 Identifying the sites where transformation can take
place is thus central to achieving justice in post-conflict ecologies defined by a flawed
transition.
Transformative justice is not beyond the critiques that have plagued transitional
justice in the past, however. Transformative justice scholarship has been criticised for
stacking the transitional justice framework with further normative expectations, and
expanding its interdisciplinary spaces beyond the field’s remit.38 McAuliffe questions
whether the transition from war to peace is actually an appropriate transformative
constitutional moment, as some of the scholarship suggests; or whether behavioural
norms have come to dictate the policy options available to international and domes-
tic actors. Furthermore, much of the transitional/transformative literature presents a
reductive dyadic, relationship between domestic and interactional actors which
obscures a clear vision of where power and influence reside in existing societal struc-
tures.39 What is missing is a transformative analysis that can disaggregate the inter-
national, the national, and the local; interrogate the bargaining processes that limit
the scope of transitional justice strategies in practice; and link these findings to a
practicable theory of change that furthers ‘the transformative turn as an intellectual
endeavour.’40
33 Gready and Robins, supra n3 at 348-349.
34 Ibid at 349.
35 Ibid at 358; De Greiff, supra n 11.
36 David Roberts, Liberal Peacebuilding and Global Governance: Beyond the Metropolis (London; New York:
Routledge, 2013); in Gready and Robins, supra n 3.
37 Lambourne, supra n 5; Balasco, supra n 15; Gready and Robins, supra n 3.
38 Balasco, supra n 15.
39 McAuliffe, supra n 13 at 252.
40 McAuliffe, supra n 15 at 167; McAuliffe supra n 13.
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Such an ambition may be beyond the conceptual scope of this paper. Where tran-
sitional justice mechanisms are the focus of a transformative analysis, significant con-
ceptual challenges present themselves. First, such an analysis may neglect the
political factors that might help or hinder transformation prior to the design or im-
plementation of the transitional justice mechanism. Second, the use of transformative
justice as a means of evaluating transitional justice hinders the development of trans-
formative justice as a field in its own right: ‘one that may extend beyond transitional
justice.’41 However, a transformative framework does allow a critical approach to ana-
lyzing transitional justice mechanisms by revealing typologies of participation.42 That
is exactly the aim of this paper. A critical retrospective of the CPA reveals how it pre-
scribed a particular typology of participation that would frame the Sudanese transi-
tion. In exploring the agreement’s transitional mechanisms, this paper seeks to
identify where the Sudanese transition was contested; how the transition neglected
other power struggles; and how it failed to deliver a positive vision of transformative
justice. A case study of Sudan may also free the potentially transformative aspects of
the CPA from their ‘particular spaces, times and issues of focus,’43 thereby distilling
aspects of the transformative justice framework for future application.
I I I . T H E N O R T H – S O U T H C O N F L I C T I N S U D A N
While the North–South conflict represented a prolonged and violent expression of
political grievance, it ‘was just one part of a broader web of conflicts involving com-
peting claims. . . to land, water, natural resources, political power or cultural iden-
tity.’44 Conflict has plagued Sudan for decades, and the conflicts in Darfur, South
Kordofan and Blue Nile share many of their root causes with that of the North–
South conflict including religious and racial discrimination, and economic and polit-
ical marginalisation. This paper adopts the North–South conflict as its exclusive
focus, however. This reflects the central government’s ‘piecemeal regional approach’
to peacemaking, which prevented Sudan’s various rebel groups from uniting against
Khartoum’s privileged position.45 Furthermore, the North–South peace process
spanned 40 years, thus creating the longest paper trail of conflict resolution instru-
ments in Sudan. As the most fruitful product of the North–South process, the CPA
became the legal standard to which other rebel groups aspired.46 The CPA thus rep-
resents an attempt to perfect the transitional justice mechanisms that were repeatedly
prescribed during that time.
41 Balasco, supra n 15.
42 Gready and Robins, supra n 3 at 357.
43 Ibid at 359.
44 Mark Simmons and Peter Dixon, ‘Introduction’, in Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts, ed. Mark
Simmons and Peter Dixon (Accord Conciliation Resources, 2006), 6.
45 Julian Thomas Hottinger, ‘The Darfur Peace Agreement – Expectations Unfulfilled’, in Peace by Piece:
Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts, ed. Mark Simmons and Peter Dixon (Accord Conciliation Resources,
2006), 47.
46 Ibid. at 48. Hottinger alleges that rebel groups in Darfur ‘expected a comprehensive agreement of their
own,’ but this has proven impracticable under the exclusive nature of the CPA’s power-sharing
provisions.
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The debate on the causes of Sudan’s civil wars is—much like the Sudanese con-
flicts themselves—‘divisive and far from settled.’47 The effects of religious differen-
ces, economic exploitation and colonial intervention have all played their part in
fuelling the conflict, ‘but none, by itself, fully explains it.’48 Prior to independence,
Britain and Egypt administered the Sudan as two separate regions, ‘with political
power and control of the country’s extensive natural resources, as well as decisions
over education, policy, language and cultural identity, centered in the north.’49 On
the eve of Sudanese independence, the country existed as two wholly different eco-
nomic systems: one ‘was relatively well developed and the other was one of the least
developed parts of the British global empire.’50 This institutionalized pattern of
underdevelopment and neglect would haunt Sudan for its entire 20th century
history.
Following independence, power was centred in the hands of a north Sudanese,
Arab–Islamic elite whose vision rarely extended beyond its own power base in the
golden triangle between the Blue and White Niles. The Arab–Islamic identity was
employed as a central tenet of nation building, and institutionalized policies of
Arabization and Islamization became a feature of the new Sudanese republic.51
However, far from creating an ethnically distinct Islamic nation in Sudan, these poli-
cies often had the opposite effect: ‘they created a fierce reaction which in many ways
solidified and cemented identities along ethnic and cultural lines. . .’52 Southern lead-
ers soon realized that the chronic underdevelopment and cyclical violence in the
south was the product of the northern elite’s efforts to culturally dominate the re-
gion. Faced with inequalities in political and economic opportunity, the African,
Christian and Animist South took up arms against the Sudanese state; initially as a
myriad coalition of tribes and later, under John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A). El-Battahani defines the resulting conflict as a contest
between the centre and the periphery arising from ‘economic, resource-based, ethnic,
cultural, religious and international’ concerns, all of which were exacerbated by the
centralized government’s ‘crisis of legitimacy and its utility as a vehicle for economic
exploitation.’53
47 Luka Biong Deng, ‘The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Will It Be Sustained?’, Civil Wars 7, no.
3 (2005): 245, https://doi.org/10.1080/13698280500423924.
48 Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, African Issues (Oxford: Currey, 2007), 1–2;
in Amel Aldehaib, ‘Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement Viewed through the Eyes of the Women of
South Sudan’, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation Fellows Programme Occasional Paper, (2010), 3.
49 Dan Connell, ‘Peace in Sudan Prospect or Pipe Dream?’ Middle East Report, no. 228 (2003): 3.
50 Andrew S. Natsios, Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York/Oxford;
Oxford University Press, 2012), 27.
51 Abel Alier, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 2nd edn, Sudan Studies Series 13
(London: Ithaca Press Reading, 1992), 24. Christian missionary activities were prohibited, except under
license, and Muslim schools sprang up in both urban and rural areas. Arabic became the language of in-
struction in schools, and southern public servants were made redundant for their lack of Arabic. A recruit-
ment ban for the police and prison forces came into effect in the south, and vacant places in these sectors
were filled with recruits from the north.
52 Anders Breidlid, ‘The Role of Education in Sudan’s Civil War’, Prospects 43, no. 1 (2013): 39.
53 Atta el-Battahani, ‘A Complex Web – Politics and Conflict in Sudan’, in Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s
Conflicts, ed. Mark Simmons and Peter Dixon (Accord Conciliation Resources, 2006), 10.
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Even prior to the North–South negotiations that culminated with the CPA, com-
mentators noted that confronting the root causes of the civil war would necessitate a
radical reframing of Sudanese society.54 As Connell surmises, the conflict did not
lend itself to simple solutions because every issue carried significant political, cultural
and economic value, ‘from the definition of what it means to be a citizen of Sudan to
who controls the country’s newfound oil wealth. . ..’55 Sudan has thus been the site
of two conflicts: the North–South conflict itself, and what McGarry and O’Leary call
the ‘meta-conflict’ – the contest to define what the conflict is about.56 This ‘meta-
contestation’ is central to conflict resolution efforts, ‘because each meta-conflict
position presupposes a different set of solutions to the conflict. . ..’57 The state’s
dominance over this ‘meta-conflict’ can be readily observed in the peace process,
which has repeatedly neglected the legitimate grievances of the southern peoples.
Both the Addis Ababa Agreement (1972) and the Sudan Agreement (1997) failed to
meaningfully address the role of religion and wealth in the North–South conflict,
and both remained subject to Khartoum’s unilateral implementation.58 The southern
movement’s inability to contest the ‘meta-conflict’ can duly be linked to its failure to
secure its political aspirations over time. It was not until 1998, when Khartoum
ceded control of negotiations to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD), that the parties began to take meaningful steps towards peace.
Initially, progress was slow. Negotiations in Nairobi in July 1999 made no sub-
stantial progress, nor did two further meetings over the course of 2000. It was only
when the United States shifted its policies towards Sudan that the IGAD process
began to make headway. Following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the administration of
George W. Bush stepped up its effort to resolve the North–South conflict, with
President Bush telephoning President Bashir a dozen times during the negotiations
that culminated with the CPA.59 Domestic politics also favoured peace at this time.
The position of pragmatists and moderate Islamist elements in Khartoum encour-
aged compromise with the SPLM/A in return for normalised relations with the inter-
national community, particularly the US. The US also had a significant influence as
part of the Troika, in partnership with the United Kingdom and Norway. The chief
mediator in the IGAD process, General Lazaro Sumbeiyo, used the Troika to break
deadlock in negotiations, and the Troika later resolved disputes in the interim period
that followed the CPA.60
54 Taisier Mohamed Ahmed Ali and Robert O. Matthews, Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution (Ithaca/
Montreal; McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 217.
55 Connell, supra n 49 at 3.
56 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (Oxford/Cambridge:
Blackwell, 1995); in Christine Bell, ‘Contending with the Past: Transitional Justice and Political
Settlement Processes’, in Justice Mosaics: How Context Shapes Transitional Justice in Fractured Societies, ed.
Roger Duthie and Paul Seils (NYC: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2017), 91.
57 Bell, supra n 56 at 91.
58 Gene Carolan, ’Statebuilding in the Peace Agreements of Sudan and South Sudan,’ Journal
ofIntervention and Statebuilding, (3 January 2020): 1–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2019.
1703492.
59 Natsios, supra n 50.
60 Johan Brosché and Allard Duursma, ‘Hurdles to Peace: A Level-of-Analysis Approach to Resolving
Sudan’s Civil Wars’, Third World Quarterly 39, no. 3 (4 March 2018): 560–76, https://doi.org/10.1080/
01436597.2017.1333417.
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Despite this international dimension, the mediators do not appear to have given
much thought to the constituencies that were admitted to the IGAD process. The
CPA was predicated on an equitable but exclusive distribution of power between the
National Congress Party and the SPLM/A, both of which represented a minority of
the Sudanese population. However, John Garang’s vision of a secular Sudan in which
religion was a personal preference had long resonated with liberal politicians in the
US, and this helped to establish the SPLM/A as the legitimate representative of
southern aspirations internationally.61 As a result, the mediators do not appear to
have given much thought to how other constituencies or dimensions, such as gender,
were represented in the CPA.62 Chief mediator Sumbeiyo did attempt to raise the
prospect of a pan-Sudanese process that would address the conflicts in east Sudan
and Darfur, but the central government would not allow it: ‘Every time I tried to
raise it they said, “oh, you want to come and resolve all our conflicts? Come to
Darfur, come to Eastern Sudan, we have enough problems. Come to the north; we
have a lot of problems!”’63 Despite the modest efforts of the mediators, the CPA was
more of a product of national and international political dynamics than the result of
an international transitional or transformative agenda.
The CPA’s exhaustive detail provided an initial burst of momentum that secured
a functioning regional government of South Sudan (GoSS) in the early days of the
peace process. Immediately thereafter, progress began to stall. Disputes over wealth
sharing and the Sudanese military’s withdrawal from South Sudan caused the CPA’s
power sharing provisions to break down in 2007. Though the dispute was resolved
by the end of that year, nationwide general elections scheduled for July 2009 did not
occur until April 2010. As progress slowed, South Sudan’s 2011 referendum on self-
determination came to be seen as the CPA’s ‘centre-piece,’ and the costs of hard en-
gagement in a transformative project became much more obvious than the costs of
secession.64 The people of South Sudan duly voted for secession in January 2011,
and on 9 July, South Sudan became an independent state. In the next section, this
paper examines how the CPA’s transitional mechanisms affected that outcome.
I V . T R A N S I T I O N A N D T R A N S F O R M A T I O N U N D E R T H E C P A
The CPA featured many of the transitional justice and statebuilding processes that
are common to liberal peacebuilding interventions. The agreement prescribed power
and wealth sharing; national and international human rights protections; and reform
of the security sector, the judiciary, and the constitution in order to give effect to the
61 Cirino Hiteng Ofuho, ‘Negotiating Peace – Restarting a Moribund Process’, in Peace by Piece: Addressing
Sudan’s Conflicts, ed. Mark Simmons and Peter Dixon (Accord Conciliation Resources, 2006); John
Young, The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process (London; New York:
Zed Books, 2012).
62 Anne Itto, ‘Guests at the Table? The Role of Women in Peace Processes’, in Peace by Piece: Addressing
Sudan’s Conflicts, ed. Mark Simmons and Peter Dixon (Accord Conciliation Resources, 2006).
63 Mark Simmons and Peter Dixon, ‘The Mediator’s Perspective – An Interview with General Lazaro
Sumbeiyo’, in Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts, ed. Mark Simmons and Peter Dixon (Accord
Conciliation Resources, 2006), 37.
64 Edward Thomas, ‘Against the Gathering Storm – Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement’
(Chatham House, 2009), 6, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/13800/uploads.
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agreement’s provisions.65 In this particular respect, the CPA may be tentatively
regarded as a transitional justice instrument, insofar as it sought to break with a leg-
acy of centralized, authoritarian government and restricted civil and political life.
However, the agreement was virtually silent on the issue of accountability, and in pla-
ces, it explicitly prevented it. The agreement’s power-sharing provisions ensured that
senior members of the ruling National Congress Party and the SPLM/A could shield
themselves from any accountability processes through executive action; for example,
by appointing or removing officials in Sudan’s judicial system. Indeed, the National
Congress Party was able to use its domination of the national government—as guar-
anteed by the CPA—to repeatedly resist any calls for the surrender of (then) presi-
dent Omar Al Bashir to the International Criminal Court.66 Al Bashir further
politicised the International Criminal Court indictment in order to consolidate his
grip on power and to foment hostility to the CPA in the years following South
Sudan’s independence.67 Given this flagrant denial of justice, it is difficult to describe
the CPA as an instrument of transitional justice.
That said, the CPA does provide a blueprint towards a limited concept of justice.
The agreement was even premised on a transformative vision of positive peace,
pledging to replace war in Sudan ‘not just with peace, but also with social, political
and economic justice which respects the fundamental human and political rights of
all the Sudanese people.’68 The CPA’s provisions on wealth-sharing and socioeco-
nomic rights supported this vision in theory, but they could not guarantee the polit-
ical will to orient these provisions towards transformative ends.69 Such
transformative change requires an attitudinal shift that transitional justice mecha-
nisms ‘can only ground but not produce.’70 As Balasco duly warns, transformative
justice advocates should be careful not ‘to assign transformative justice tasks to tran-
sitional justice mechanisms, because these mechanisms may be incapable of deliver-
ing such transformation.’ This is an important point to bear in mind as this article
proceeds to its central analysis.
While the CPA did affect a transformative shift in the North–South relationship,
in doing so it maintained a state-centric approach that prioritized institutional
change. The agreement provided for a complex transitional infrastructure that gave
the SPLM/A a joint role in implementing the agreement. As such, it is the first truly
bilateral instrument to emanate from the North–South conflict. The parties could
65 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (Comprehensive Peace Agreement), 9
January 2005 http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_060000_The
%20Comprehensive%20Peace%20Agreement.pdf (accessed 19 August 2017). Chapter II, Part I, Article
1.6.1 obliges the Sudanese state to comply with the international legal framework on political, economic,
social, cultural and human rights.
66 Vandeginste and Sriram, supra n 18.
67 Mattia Cacciatori, ‘When Kings Are Criminals: Lessons from ICC Prosecutions of African Presidents’,
International Journal of Transitional Justice 12, no. 3 (2018): 386–406.
68 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, supra n 65 at Chapter I, Part A, Article 1.5.2.
69 Padraig McAuliffe, ‘Dividing the Spoils: The Impact of Power Sharing on Possibilities for Socioeconomic
Transformation in Postconflict States’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 11, no. 2 (July 2017):
197–217, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijx004.
70 De Greiff, supra n 11 at 52.
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settle disputes pertaining to the agreement through the senior political decision mak-
ing body, the Political Commission. Joint Military Committees served as forums for
communication and dispute resolution in the tense postconflict security environ-
ment. Notably, both the Political Commission and the Joint Military Committees
were required to reach their decisions by consensus.71 Failing resolution at this level,
disputes among the various peacebuilding organs could be referred up to the
Constitutional Court of Sudan, which had ultimate interpretive authority over the
CPA. This level of inclusion was hitherto unprecedented in Sudan’s history of con-
flict resolution.
While these mechanisms did succeed in transitioning the North–South conflict to
a postconflict state, the framing of the ‘meta-conflict’ under the CPA cut off the
range of mechanisms and constituents necessary to affect a transformative change in
Sudan’s political culture. The CPA correctly identified the North–South conflict as a
consequence of an exploitative centre–periphery relationship. However, it sought to
resolve that conflict by coopting peripheral southern elites into the centre. Even in
2010, a multi donor evaluation had identified a disconnect between regional and
local government structures in South Sudan, and warned against duplicating the
Khartoum–South relationship in South Sudan by placing ‘[t]oo much focus on
Juba.’72 The highly devolved GoSS envisioned on paper was overly reliant on formal
institutions in practice, despite contemporaneous claims that local government
would be central to securing peace in South Sudan.73 Indeed, anxieties about local
issues such as land ownership led to conflict in the South, with interethnic violence
actually increasing after the conclusion of the CPA.74 Many of the subsequent issues
that plagued South Sudan’s postconflict transition can be traced back to the way that
the North–South meta-conflict was framed in the CPA. That the CPA failed to con-
front these inequitable structures of power in Sudanese society is a denial of trans-
formative justice, and largely explains why cycles of violence have continued to
regenerate in South Sudan.
By framing Sudan’s meta-conflict along a North–South axis and distributing
power accordingly, the CPA allowed the National Congress Party and the SPLM/A
to consolidate their power to the detriment of the myriad constituents that com-
prised Sudanese society.75 The CPA’s provisions on ‘the three areas’ best illustrate
how the CPA’s transitional mechanisms did not extend to other marginalised constit-
uents. The CPA prescribed particular arrangements for Sudan’s three areas; Abyei,
South Kordofan, and Blue Nile; each of which were supposed to be subject to the
will of the people of in those regions. However, this never came to be. The three
areas were not consulted as the CPA promised, yet the peace process moved forward
71 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, supra n 65 at Annexure I, Part I, Articles 14.4 and 14.6.4, respectively.
72 Jon Bennett et al., ‘Aiding the Peace: A Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and
Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005—2010’ (United Kingdom: ITAD Ltd, December
2010), xix.
73 Adam Branch and Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, ‘Winning the War, but Losing the Peace? The Dilemma
of SPLM/A Civil Administration and the Tasks Ahead’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 1
(2005): 1–20.
74 Thomas, supra n 64 at 28.
75 Alex de Waal, ‘Peace and the Security Sector in Sudan, 2002–11’, African Security Review 26, no. 2
(2017): 182, https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2017.1297582.
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regardless. When South Sudan voted to secede from the Republic of Sudan in
January 2011, fighting broke out in South Kordofan and the national government
forcibly seized Abyei. The unrest spread to Blue Nile several months later, and the
conflict remains unresolved to date. Clearly the CPA’s provisions have done little to
foment the transformative dynamics necessary to challenge Khartoum’s systematic
neglect of these areas.
The CPA’s provisions on wealth sharing are also implicated in this framing of the
North–South meta-conflict. As with most of its key terms, the CPA’s wealth sharing
provisions were dependent on national, formal institutions that were divorced from
the everyday needs of ordinary people throughout Sudan. The agreement’s state-
centric provisions redistributed wealth ‘so as to enable each level of government to
discharge its legal and constitutional responsibilities and duties.’76 The provision of
specific formulae for the redistribution of oil revenues was central to forcing the issue
of southern self-determination, given Khartoum’s reluctance to address the more
contentious aspects of the CPA towards the end of the interim period. However, by
linking wealth redistribution to national level institutions, the CPA inhibited any sort
of meaningful bottom-up initiative that could challenge some of Sudan’s structures
of economic injustice.77 Instead, the CPA inadvertently reproduced Khartoum’s klep-
tocratic system of political patronage in which every aspect of the oil business inter-
sects with a web of divisive politics.78 This has traditionally allowed Khartoum to
maintain its privileged position at the centre by admitting or buying off any stake-
holders with sufficient political clout. Since the conclusion of the CPA in 2005,
South Sudan has functioned as a system ‘even less regulated and no less brutal than
its northern counterpart,’79 with political and armed opposition coopted through ad-
mittance to ‘the big tent’ at the political centre. When oil revenues were cut off
owing to a dispute with the Republic of Sudan in January 2012, this strategy was no
longer tenable, and the resulting political tensions led to civil war.
Ironically, attempts to resolve the South Sudanese conflict to date have adopted
the CPA’s strategy of dividing power amongst the political elite. Both the 2015
Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and its
revitalised 2018 counterpart sought to resolve the conflict by admitting the principal
armed actors to privileged positions of power and wealth. The Sudanese experience
of transition suggests that such measures are conducive to neither sustainable peace
nor transformative justice. In order to affect transformative justice in South Sudan,
wealth sharing must be locally oriented, locally driven; and committed to welfare and
security provision for normal citizens rather than political patronage for elites. This
could possibly be achieved by a broad based power-sharing government that is
guided by an explicit elaboration of socioeconomic rights, as originally referenced in
the CPA.80 Typically, peace agreements do not tend towards such radical visions of
76 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, supra n 65 at Chapter III, Part I, Article 1.2.
77 McAuliffe, supra n 69 at 216.
78 Luke A. Patey, ‘Crude Days Ahead? OIL and the Resource Curse in Sudan’, African Affairs 109, no. 437
(2010): 617–36, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adq043.
79 Alex de Waal, ‘When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan’,
African Affairs 113, no. 452 (2014): 349, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adu028.
80 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, supra n 65 at Chapter II, Part I, Article 1.6.1.
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social transformation, due to the relatively short span of a transition from war to
postconflict. However, such a limited concept of transition and transformation
neglects the myriad ways in which opportunities for economic power repeatedly pre-
sent themselves in ordinary everyday politics.81 Finding the political will to imple-
ment such an equitable framework remains a significant challenge in South Sudan,
however, given the extent to which political elites are implicated in this kleptocratic
system.82
Elsewhere, the CPA’s provisions on security sector reform (SSR) and disarma-
ment, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) processes did provide some trans-
formative potential. Though SSR and DDR measures are not directly concerned
with legal standards of accountability, they are often prerequisite—if not essential—
to it. They may duly be regarded as part of the transitional justice framework, and
are assessed as such herein.83 Indeed, de Waal has previously pointed to the trans-
formative potential of SSR, arguing that ‘[w]hen the security sector is exposed to
democratic pressures, the political demand for SSR becomes a reality, and the space
for reform exists.’84 However, the CPA’s SSR and DDR provisions maintained the
agreement’s state-centric focus, seeking to assert the legitimacy and authority of state
institutions. This state-centric focus came at the expense of key local dynamics,
which were repeatedly neglected despite their potential role in providing security
and services in places where formal state institutions could not.85 de Waal identified
the lack of local consultation in SSR in Sudan as ‘a major missed opportunity’ for
conflict transformation.86 Another transformative opportunity spurned in the context
of SSR was the CPA’s joint integrated units. These were military units comprised of
both the Sudanese military and the SPLM/A that would provide the nucleus of a na-
tional army if the referendum on southern self-determination confirmed unity. The
parties made substantial progress on the integrated units between 2005 and 2011,
but South Sudan’s declaration of independence in July 2011 made their transforma-
tive potential moot.
Though almost 50,000 combatants were demobilised under the CPA, the process
was largely a ‘charade’ whereby ‘[t]he budget allocated was used,’ ‘individuals. . .
received demobilisation benefits,’ ‘and reports of demobilisation were duly pro-
duced.’ In reality, the number of soldiers increased after demobilisation as the parties
moved to expand and consolidate their gains under the agreement.87 This reality
reflects existing scholarship in the field, which notes a tension between SSR and
DDR efforts and the concept of transitional justice. Where ex combatants are
included in SSR and DDR processes, they can potentially resist or refuse future
attempts to impose accountability, as in Sudan. Similarly, affording ex combatants
81 McAuliffe, supra n 69.
82 Leben Moro et al., ‘Statebuilding and Legitimacy – Experiences of South Sudan’ (United Kingdom:
Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, 2017), 22.
83 Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice’,
Global Society 21, no. 4 (2007): 579–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/13600820701562843.
84 de Waal, supra n 75 at 187-195.
85 Bennett et al., supra n 72 at 145.
86 de Waal, supra n 75 at 187-195.
87 Ibid.
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reintegration opportunities will seem grossly unfair to some victims, and can be con-
strued as rewarding violence, as has also occurred in Sudan.88 Such phenomena can-
not be reconciled with any concept of justice. In such situations, the clash between
these paradigms is bypassed by applying only one of them.89
The CPA was an incredibly precise agreement, providing an ambitious political
framework for transforming the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. The
agreement set out a formal and expansive institutional infrastructure through which
power and wealth could be shared on a bilateral basis, allowing South Sudan to self-
determine its political future. However, the CPA was merely a means of reframing
the North–South conflict; not a way of transforming it. The agreement failed to
achieve its vision of social, political and economic justice for all Sudanese, as the
Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) protests in April 2019 demonstrated. Could
the CPA have affected a more transformative outcome? Had Sudan’s other political
parties and civil society organisations been included in negotiations, it is tempting to
answer in the affirmative. The CPA was negotiated exclusively between the National
Congress Party and the SPLM/A, with no input from women—even on the SPLM/
A side. Civil society organisations, in particular, may have anticipated the local con-
cerns that fuelled intermittent conflict throughout Sudan in the aftermath of the
CPA, and diverted resources accordingly. For all its references to correcting injustice,
inequality, and marginalisation, the CPA did little to consider these terms beyond its
North–South axis, begging the question: justice for who?90
Though these criticisms impart valuable lessons about the negative effects of cer-
tain transitional mechanisms, their alternatives surmise the elusiveness of a perfect
peace. Had negotiations involved a broader process of inclusion, they ran the risk of
not producing any agreement at all. Aalen notes that attempts to include northern
opposition parties in the initial IGAD negotiations in 1994 were a non-starter, while
the attempt to consolidate several southern splinter groups into a viable political
party under the Sudan Agreement in 1997 arguably did more harm than good to the
prospects of lasting peace.91 Ultimately, the CPA produced a negative peace, marked
by the periodic absence of war rather than the creation of transformative political
and social practices. If Sudan and South Sudan are to escape their common history
of conflict, transitional justice will not be enough. The peoples of Sudan and South
Sudan must confront inequitable structures of power through a transformative ap-
proach that scrutinises the role that transitional mechanisms have played in maintain
those structures in the past.
V . S U D A N A N D S O U T H S U D A N I N T R A N S I T I O N O N C E M O R E
A retroactive analysis of the Sudanese experience of transition is particularly relevant
at this moment in time. Following Al Bashir’s removal from office in April 2019,
Sudan is facing a ‘twin transition’ from both authoritarianism and armed conflict.
88 Vandeginste and Sriram, supra n 18; McAuliffe, supra n 69; Andreas Mehler, ‘Peace and Power Sharing in
Africa: A Not so Obvious Relationship’, African Affairs 108, no. 432 (2009): 453–73.
89 Vandeginste and Sriram, supra n 18 at 498.
90 Aldehaib, supra n 48.
91 Lovise Aalen, ‘Making Unity Unattractive: The Conflicting Aims of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace
Agreement’, Civil Wars 15, no. 2 (2013): 176.
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Attempts to implement transformative change in such contexts are incredibly chal-
lenging. Of around 35 attempts at twin transitions since 1990, ‘only a handful can be
rated as successful in terms of at least ending conflict violence. . ..’92 Indeed, Natsios
previously predicted that the kleptocratic, survivalist nature of Al Bashir’s regime
could make a post Bashir Sudan ungovernable, and a potential dissolution unman-
ageable.93 However, key political actors are too embedded in Sudan’s neopatrimonial
politics to simply fall away. Individuals such as General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo
(Hemeti) will be able to leverage political or military capital to buy back into the
Sudanese political marketplace—a worrying trend that is particularly pervasive in
Africa.94 It is worth reflecting on the extent to which the CPA propped up this neo-
patrimonial system as Sudan moves to transition towards a democratic state that can
be relied upon for the provision of services and welfare. Pospisil notes that carefully
negotiated transitional arrangements will be central to balancing the political capital
of members of the old regime against the demands of the protest movement.95
A transformative approach informed by Sudan’s experience of the CPA can aug-
ment the FCC’s attempts to design the institutions that will transition Sudan from
kleptocracy to democracy. Many of the FFC’s demands are synonymous with the
demands of transitional justice and its wider role in advancing democratization and
maintaining peace and human security: negotiating an end to the armed conflicts in
Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile; revising the national constitution; and hold-
ing elections.96 Pospisil argues that the transition should proceed in that order, as it
essential that the myriad armed groups participate in the transitional legal and polit-
ical processes.97 Sudan’s transition appears to hold much transformative potential: it
is a grassroots movement that has united a highly competitive political system behind
the goal of removing Al Bashir’s regime.98 However, Sudan now finds itself at the be-
ginning of a very challenging transitional process in which the move from violence is
rarely linear but potentially chaotic, as violent clampdowns on popular protests in
Khartoum attest.99 Particularly strong transitional provisions will be needed to re-
strict the Sudanese military’s legitimate use of violence and transition the military to
political forums for negotiation and dialogue. The use or threat of transitional justice
as a means of impacting the balance of power between the FCC and the military
may yet play an important role in this process.100
92 Jan Pospisil, ‘Sudan’s Enduring Transition: Evolving Arrangements after the Fall of Bashir’, Spotlight
Series (University of Edinburgh: Political Settlements Research Programme, 2019), 4, http://www.politi
calsettlements.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/PA-X-Spotlight-Sudan-Digital.pdf: “. . .namely Nepal,
Liberia, Sierra Leone (eventually), Mozambique in the early 1990s, and Kosovo as well as Bosnia
Herzegovina (the last two involving extensive international military intervention).”
93 Natsios, supra n 50 at 200.
94 Denis M. Tull and Andreas Mehler, ‘The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent
Violence in Africa’, African Affairs 104, no. 416 (2005): 375–98.
95 Pospisil, supra n 92.
96 Teitel, supra n 2 at 2.
97 Pospisil, supra n 92.
98 Yasir Zaidan, ‘How to Make Sudan’s Revolution Succeed’, Foreign Policy, 9 September 2019, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/09/how-to-make-sudans-revolution-succeed-hemeti-burhan-tmc/.
99 Bell, supra n 8.
100 Bell, supra n 56 at 90; cf. Cacciatori, supra n 67.
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Following the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the
Republic of South Sudan in September 2018, South Sudan now finds itself in a tenta-
tive post settlement transition. Understanding the CPA is central to managing the
transition under the revitalised agreement, which recycles many of the CPA’s flawed
mechanisms. Power has once again been concentrated among the actors that domi-
nated the political landscape before the South Sudanese civil war. However, patron-
age networks in South Sudan have been so exhausted and have become so
factionalised that there no longer exists any distinct parties to lead a transformative
peacebuilding/statebuilding project.101 The current peace deal shares power amongst
a government—rebel dyad that is completely ‘fictitious’: most of the opposition lead-
ership were part of the South Sudanese government or military prior to their dismis-
sal by President Silva Kiir in December 2013.102 After five years of conflict, the 2018
agreement reinstates the status quo ante, returning political power to an elite cabal
in Juba.
The concentration of power in the hands of a political elite has left little legitimate
space for civil society groups and other parties to contest this power. As a result, vio-
lence remains a viable means of communicating grievance in the contested political
space that divides centre and periphery in South Sudan. In orienting solutions
around a government—rebel dyad, local actors have previously been encouraged to
take up arms and align with one ‘side’ in order to have their grievances heard at the
negotiating table. Ongoing efforts to resolve the conflict continue to incentivise this
approach. This underscores the need for a transformative approach to the conflict in
South Sudan. A state-centric approach has repeatedly neglected local concerns, caus-
ing peripheral regions to be drawn into the conflict in order to ensure that their
grievances are heard. Recent efforts have also focused on the violence caused by the
government—rebel conflict at the expense of the less visible forms of violence that
South Sudanese experienced daily before the outbreak of civil war.103 These forms of
violence must be confronted as part of a transformative vision of transitional justice.
Only a political process of broad based participation can address the local issues
that will dictate the sustainability of the South Sudanese state, and these issues lie be-
yond the elitist contest for control of the centre. Policy makers have repeatedly called
for a range of mechanisms to facilitate the inclusion of marginalised stakeholders in
the statebuilding project, including a parliamentary executive, stronger federalist
structures and a broadly constitutive process of national dialogue. Indeed, South
Sudan’s ‘newness’ has been repeatedly cited as an opportunity to experiment with in-
novative models of statebuilding. To date, top-down transitional approaches have
favoured preservation of the status quo over radical redefinition of the South
Sudanese state. Fundamentally, the country requires a ‘reworking of the governance
agreement between and within elites and communities if a negotiated settlement is
101 Nicki Kindersley and Øystein H. Rolandsen, ‘Prospects for Peace and the UN Regional Protection
Force in South Sudan’, African Affairs, 2016, 12.
102 Lotje de Vries and Mareike Schomerus, ‘South Sudan’s Civil War Will Not End with a Peace Deal’,
Peace Review 29, no. 3 (2017): 335, https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344533.
103 Ibid.
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to lead to a sustainable peace.’104 Only a transformative approach can negotiate these
systems of governance from the ground up, and unleash the transformative dynamics
necessary to achieve the CPA’s vision of economic and social justice.
V I . C O N C L U S I O N S
At its core, the CPA prescribed national level institutions that could transition—ra-
ther than transform—the North–South conflict into peaceful political spaces. In this
respect, it was largely successful. The CPA provided forums for further negotiation
and dispute resolution, ensuring a sustainable period of transition that secured a
functioning GoSS in the wake of the agreement’s conclusion. This proved crucial to
forcing progress on other aspects of the agreement in the latter stages of the transi-
tion. The CPA thus successfully transformed the North–South armed conflict into a
political one that the parties could challenge ‘through the agreement’s new institu-
tional provision.’105
Even with the provision of dispute resolution mechanisms, deadlock characterised
the transition under the CPA. Disputes were referred up the dispute resolution hier-
archy, but many were left unresolved due to deadlock within the Sudanese
Presidency and the Political Commission. What is crucial, however, is that the parties
did not resort to violence as a means of breaking this deadlock. Political negotiation
and dialogue became normalised under the CPA, which managed to contain the vio-
lence and allowed a new political consensus to emerge.106 Previous peace agreements
in Sudan failed to provide these channels of communication and negotiation, thus
incentivising violence as a political bargaining tool and inviting their collapse.
Though the CPA experienced setbacks as it wore on, its mechanisms arguably sus-
tained the transition beyond the agreement itself. In this regard, it can be considered
a success.
However, it must be remembered that transitional justice mechanisms do not re-
solve the conflict; they merely change the ways in which it is fought. Transitional
mechanisms represent a political extension of the battlefield where the nature and
direction of the transition remain contested. Whoever can win the transition can ul-
timately win the peace by directing the transitional mechanisms ‘towards an end
point for transition that approximates to the victor’s battlefield goals.’107 The
Sudanese experience of transition exemplifies this. Over the course of the North–
South conflict, autonomy has been the principal vehicle for assuaging southern griev-
ances. However, the ways in which the parties were able to control autonomy as a
transitional vehicle had a significant impact on how southern self-determination
played out in practice. Both the Addis Ababa and Sudan Peace Agreements were un-
done by Khartoum’s ultimate control over the transitional infrastructure and the
South’s resulting inability to contest the direction of the transition. The CPA, in con-
trast, was the first North–South agreement to create a truly autonomous southern
104 International Crisis Group, ‘South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name’, Africa Report (Addis
Ababa/Juba/Nairobi/Brussels, 10 April 2014) (ii).
105 Bell, supra n 56 at 94.
106 Bell, supra n 8.
107 Ibid. at 26.
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polity capable of forcing the issue southern self-determination when implementation
of the agreement began to falter. In allowing the SPLM/A to contest its transitional
mechanisms, the CPA ultimately delivered on the SPLM/A’s political and military
objective: an independent South Sudan. In doing so, the CPA secured transition but
spurned transformation, as the enduring conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan attest.
Recent scholarship has flagged the need to move beyond analyses of transitional
justice mechanisms and to focus on the bargaining processes that can compromise or
capture transitional/transformative initiatives instead.108 Indeed, there is substantial
overlap between the transformative analyses advanced herein and the ‘political settle-
ments’ discourse, despite some apparent tension regarding the meaning of ‘political
settlement’ in the context of transition.109 Kelsall has defined a political settlement as
an agreement that ends conflict between powerful groups; that is oriented around a
set of political institutions and a distribution of power; and is expected to deliver an
acceptable distribution of benefits. In Kelsall’s political settlements analysis, the focus
should be on those actors with the ability to seriously disrupt, unsettle, or overturn
the settlement. Such actors may have violent capability, king-making ability, or the
capacity to mobilize en masse. In response, the political leadership may attempt to
co-opt or repress these actors. Adopting Kelsall’s framework, pre-CPA Sudan or con-
temporary South Sudan would not have a political settlement, as several powerful
actors were/are trying to change the distribution of power, and were/are using vio-
lence to do so: ‘[T]here is not even a minimal agreement on rent distribution, let
alone a common understanding or shared vision for society.’110
In contrast, Khan defines a political settlement as an ‘interactive order,’ where the
settlement is the product of many interactions between actors, but is not based on any
implicit or explicit agreement that can be identified ex ante.111 This distinction is im-
portant, as it helps to explain why an agreement on paper may function very differently
in practice , and why similar agreements experience dissimilar outcomes in comparable
contexts. For Khan, the way in which power is distributed becomes the most import-
ant factor in determining transformative change, which often takes place through new
political mobilizations, economic opportunities, or external shocks; rather than social,
cultural, or normative changes alone.112 Thus, while Kelsall’s conceptualisation pro-
vides a useful framework for evaluating peace agreements and gauging the likelihood
of sustainable peace accordingly, Khan’s view of the political settlement more closely
aligns with the transformative justice framework. Both frameworks seek to explore
how transitional mechanisms intersect or inhibit other struggles regarding access to
power and the nature of the state. This overlap is particularly pronounced when one
considers how privileged discourses and formal institutions can be used to empower
108 Balasco, supra n 15; McAuliffe, supra n 13; McAuliffe, supra n 15.
109 Tim Kelsall, ‘Towards a Universal Political Settlement Concept: A Response to Mushtaq Khan’, African
Affairs 117, no. 469 (1 October 2018): 656–69, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady018; Mushtaq H
Khan, ‘Power, Pacts and Political Settlements: A Reply to Tim Kelsall’, African Affairs, 17 May 2018,
https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady019.
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elites at the expense of victims; or how socioeconomic rights and wealth sharing provi-
sions can be used to prop up patrimonial structures.113 The link between transforma-
tive justice and political settlements discourse is duly deserving of further scholarly
attention: indeed, this link may be central to translating transformative justice from an
intellectual endeavour into a practicable theory of change. Without further investiga-
tion, the transformative turn in transitional justice literature only amounts to ‘slogan-
eering, a guide to groping the dark.’114
Nevertheless, current efforts to negotiate Sudan and South Sudan’s transitions
can learn much a retrospective analysis as advanced herein – indeed, in many ways,
such efforts are bound up in the lessons of the past. To date, transitional processes
prioritizing formal institutions in Sudan and South Sudan have neither attained a
transformative vision of justice, nor curbed the use of a violence as a means to this
end. Transformative change is most likely to take place at the local level where it can
be informed by the local and particular needs of communities affected by legacies of
violence. Neglecting this dynamic has allowed the South Sudanese civil war to spread
to previously peaceful areas and ‘draw in’ local communities. Accordingly, peace-
building efforts should prioritise popular access and participation in institutional de-
sign and implementation; encourage locally resonant mechanisms that resist
international blueprints; and provide alternatives means to challenge structures of
power at both the local and international levels.115
The Sudanese experience of transition provides an opportunity to interrogate the
limits of transitional justice and the possibilities of transformative change. Though
there has been limited knowledge transfer between the two, a transformative analysis is
central to understanding conflict as cyclical – a particular characteristic of the conflicts
in Sudan and South Sudan. However, a transformative approach also requires a ‘reflex-
ive awareness of the incompleteness of our understanding.’ Academics and peacebuild-
ers act on the basis of their own particular reading of a complex social system, not on
the basis of superior scientific knowledge. Indeed, this is why transitional mechanisms
play out so differently in different contexts, and why it is crucial that the link between
transformative justice and political settlements discourse is further investigated. A
transformative approach to institutional design must exercise due caution, as its conse-
quences impact the everyday lives and livelihoods of people.116 Pospisil has urged such
caution in the context of Sudan’s contemporary transition, noting that transitional
arrangements often become ‘sticky’ and remain well beyond their time.117 The legacy
of the CPA—itself the basis of Sudan’s ‘transitional’ constitution from the conclusion
of the agreement in July 2005 to the ouster of Al Bashir in April 2019—remains an im-
portant and relevant example in this regard, and should be given due consideration.
113 Khan, supra n 112; McAuliffe, supra n 69; Jago Salmon and Catherine Anderson, ‘Elites and
Statebuilding’, in Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding, ed. David Chandler and Timothy D.
Sisk, First issued in paperback (London: Routledge, 2015).
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